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Quantum digital signatures (QDSs) allow the sending of messages from one sender to multiple
recipients, with the guarantee that messages cannot be forged or tampered with. Additionally, messages
cannot be repudiated—if one recipient accepts a message, she is guaranteed that others will accept the same
message as well. While messaging with these types of security guarantees are routinely performed in the
modern digital world, current technologies only offer security under computational assumptions. QDSs, on
the other hand, offer security guaranteed by quantum mechanics. All thus far proposed variants of QDSs
require long-term, high quality quantum memory, making them unfeasible in the foreseeable future. Here,
we present a QDS scheme where no quantum memory is required, which also needs just linear optics. This
makes QDSs feasible with current technology.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.112.040502 PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Ex
Introduction.—Quantum digital signatures (QDSs) [1]
offer unconditionally secure exchange of classical mes-
sages between one sender and many recipients, with
security against forging and security against repudiation.
No forging means that no recipient or other party can forge
or alter a message. Security against repudiation (sometimes
called transferability) implies that a sender cannot make
recipients disagree on the validity of a message. Digital
signatures are constantly required in modern communica-
tion. However, currently used classical public-key based
digital signature protocols only offer security based on
unproven computational assumptions. The key advantage
of QDSs is in the information-theoretic security (security
against computationally unbounded adversaries), similar to
quantum key distribution (QKD).
In a generic QDS protocol, the sender sends pairs of
quantum states, quantum signatures, to the multiple recip-
ients. The recipients store the signatures in quantum
memory until the sender decides to send a particular
message. Authenticity is effectively guaranteed since the
information about the quantum signatures, accessible to
forgers, is limited. Nonrepudiability is enforced by the
recipients performing some type of nondestructive quan-
tum state comparison on the quantum signatures (for
instance, a SWAP test [1]). Although general nondestruc-
tive state comparison is currently experimentally difficult,
in [2], a QDS scheme based on coherent states was
proposed, where comparison can be performed using linear
optics. This scheme has been recently implemented [3].
However, the remaining and more challenging requirement
for QDSs to become a viable substitute for currently used
classical digital signature schemes is the quantum memory.
Digital signatures are typically used to sign messages
months or even years after the (public) keys are distributed.
Therefore, for QDSs to compete with classical protocols we
may have to store millions of qubits (or qumodes) coher-
ently, for similarly long times. This is a serious short-
coming given that state-of-the-art quantum memories
cannot achieve coherence times longer than minutes [4].
This makes all previous QDS proposals unfeasible in
practice [5]. In this Letter, we circumvent the requirement
for quantum memory. We propose a QDS scheme with the
same security guarantees as those in [1–3], without needing
quantum memory. The scheme can be implemented using
just linear optics and photodetectors that distinguish only
between zero and nonzero photons.
QDSs without quantum memory.—QDS protocols have a
distribution stage, where quantum signatures are sent to all
future recipients, and a messaging stage, where classical
messages are sent and verified. The distribution stage
enables a sender, Alice, to send a message to, in the simplest
case, either or both of two recipients, Bob and Charlie, at
some point in the future (during the messaging stage). The
distribution stage is independent of the future message sent
in the messaging stage. Our protocol differs from all
previous proposals in both stages. In the distribution stage,
the quantum signatures are converted to classical informa-
tion through quantum measurements, thus, eliminating the
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need for quantum memory. Following this, authentication
and verification procedures in the messaging stage only
process classical data. Our QDS protocol, similar to the
scheme presented in [2], uses trains of coherent states, and
a multiport (described below) for the initial part of the
distribution stage.
For simplicity, we will consider the case with two
receivers, and explain how this can be generalized later.
The quantum signatures comprise trains of coherent states
randomly chosen by Alice as jαi or j − αi [6]. In this
scheme, just as in [2,3], nonrepudiability is ensured by
using a multiport, see Fig. 1. The multiport is a passive
linear optical device comprising four 50∶50 beam splitters.
The top two belong to Bob and the bottom two to Charlie.
The input states to both Bob’s and Charlie’s first beam
splitters are a vacuum state and the inbound state from
Alice. The outputs of these beam splitters are fed into the
second two beams splitters, as shown in Fig. 1. We will
refer to the output ports of the second two beam splitters as
Bob’s and Charlie’s signal port and null port, respectively.
Intuitively, the multiport nondestructively [7] compares
the coherent states entering at Bob’s and Charlie’s in ports.
The true multiport function is twofold. It symmetrizes
the inbound states, which prevents repudiation. Also, the
null-port counts safeguard against active forging. This we
explain further below.
Similar to all other QDS proposals, we assume that all
classical communication is performed over an authenti-
cated channel (which is an inexpensive resource), and that
the quantum channel from Alice to the recipients also is
authenticated. The standard QDS assumption, that these
quantum channels are authenticated, greatly simplifies our
security analysis, but, as we elaborate at the end, for our
purposes, we actually require less than the resource-
expensive fully authenticated quantum channels.
At the end of the distribution stage, the received quantum
signatures are measured using unambiguous state discrimi-
nation (USD) [8–10], which, for two coherent states, can be
optimally realized using linear optics alone [11]. An (ideal)
unambiguous quantum measurement gives a result that is
guaranteed to be correct, at the expense of sometimes
failing to give a result at all. In the subsequent messaging
stage, Alice accompanies a message with the sequence of
phases (jαi or j − αi) she chose for the corresponding
sequence of coherent states. The recipients verify that a low
enough number of phases disagrees with those measured
during the distribution stage.
Since the security of quantum protocols such as quantum
key distribution relies on the quantum nature of states
representing data, it is not evident that security can be
maintained when quantum information is replaced by
classical information through a measurement. Previous
protocols for QDSs required the recipients to use knowl-
edge available to them only in the messaging stage for
choosing the best possible measurement to test the validity
of a signed message. In the messaging phase, recipients
should test if the signature states are orthogonal to the states
they are declared to be. If the recipients measure the
signature states directly at the end of the distribution stage,
without the knowledge of what the states are supposed to
be, then a forger could use an equally effective measure-
ment in an attempt to forge a signature. By delaying their
measurements until the messaging stage, as in previous
QDS protocols, it is clear that recipients have an advantage
over potential forgers. It is not immediately clear that the
recipients retain an advantage if signature states are
measured already in the distribution stage. We have,
however, been able to show that the classical measurement
outcomes obtained at the end of the distribution stage can
still be used for the secure distribution of messages.
The basic protocol, outlined below, describes how
single-bit messages can be securely distributed. For longer
messages, both stages are iterated. We will introduce
certain internal parameters which should be appropriately
chosen. We also introduce an external parameter L,
which directly influences the security level. Finally,
pUSD ¼ 1 − e−2α2 is the optimal success probability of
unambiguous discrimination of fjαi; j − αig [8–11].
Distribution stage.—(1) For each possible future
message k ¼ 0, 1, Alice generates two copies of a
sequence of coherent states (called quantum signatures)
FIG. 1. The multiport: The out-signal arms contain a state
symmetric under swap. The null ports contain vacuum if the in-
signal arms contained identical states. In active cheating, Bob
chooses what state η he sends back to Charlie, so as to optimize
his cheating strategies. However, Charlie’s null port counts
measure the fidelity between honest and dishonest states η. In
the figure, η is set to the honest response state.
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QuantSigk ¼⊗Ll¼1 ρkl , where ρkl ¼ jbkl αihbkl αj, α is a real
positive amplitude, bkl ∈ f−1; 1g are randomly chosen
signs, and L is a suitably chosen integer. The state
QuantSigk and the sequence of signs PrivKeyk ¼
ðbk1;…bkLÞ are called the quantum signature and the private
key, respectively, for message k. The individual state ρkl we
call the lth quantum signature element state for message k.
(2) Alice sends one copy of QuantSigk to Bob and one to
Charlie, for each possiblemessage k ¼ 0 and k ¼ 1. (3) Bob
and Charlie send their sequences QuantSigk for k ¼ 0 and
k ¼ 1, one signature element at a time, through the QDS
multiport, shown in Fig. 1. For each signature element they
(a) notewhether photons are registered at theirmultiport null
port. They also (b) measure the multiport signal states using
the USD measurement for fjαi; j − αig. They store the
unambiguous outcomes, and the index of the state for which
it occurred, for k ¼ 0, 1. Thus, they store triplets of the form
fðk; l0; bkl0 Þg where 1 ≤ l0 ≤ L.
Messaging stage.—(1) For the bit message m, Alice
sends (m, PrivKeym) to the desired recipient (say Bob).
(2) Bob checks whether (m, PrivKeym) matches with his
stored sequence, for positions where he obtained an
unambiguous outcome. In particular, he confirms that
the number of mismatches is below sapUSDL, where sa
is an authentication threshold. (3) Provided the authenti-
cation threshold was not breached, before accepting the
message, Bob checks that he has no reason to abort the
protocol. (a) If the number of signature elements for which
nonzero null-port counts are registered breaches a threshold
rL for 0 ≤ r < 1, he aborts. (b) If the number of unam-
biguous outcomes is not inside the expected interval
½ðpUSD − δÞL; ðpUSD þ δÞL, where 0 < δ < 1 is the unam-
biguous count tolerance, he aborts. If the authentication
threshold was not breached, and the protocol has not been
aborted, Bob accepts the message coming from Alice.
(4) To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards to
Charlie the pair (m, PrivKeym) he received from Alice.
Charlie tests for mismatches similarly to Bob, and checks
whether or not the number of mismatches is below
svpUSDL where sv is the verification threshold, with
0 ≤ sa < sv < 1. (5) For Charlie to accept the forwarded
message, provided the verification threshold was not
breached, he confirms that he has no reason to abort the
protocol, in the same way as Bob.
The roles Bob and Charlie play are, of course, arbitrary.
One player authenticates a message received directly from
Alice, and the other one verifies a forwarded message.
Protocol performance.—We will consider correctness,
security against repudiation, and security against forging of
our protocol, for a single bit message. Another important
property, robustness, which guarantees that the protocol
works even if physical imperfections are present, we
address briefly later in this Letter. Below, we will show
that the probabilities of incorrect behavior, forging, and
repudiation decay exponentially in L, if internal parameters
are chosen appropriately. Note that in the three-player
setting it only makes sense to consider, at most, one player
being malevolent, since two or more malevolent players
can always trivially cheat on the third.
Correctness: Correctness implies that if everybody
behaves honestly (and no imperfections are present), then
the protocol is aborted only with negligible probability, and
the message is accepted by both recipients. If everybody is
honest, abort can only occur if the number of unambiguous
outcomes either recipient obtains is outside the tolerance
window ½ðpUSD − δÞL; ðpUSD þ δÞL. This occurs with
probability
Pðhonest abortÞ ≤ ð1 − 2 exp ð−2δ2LÞÞ2: (1)
To see this, note that the expected value for the number of
unambiguous outcomes, for each recipient and if every-
body is honest, is exactly pUSDL. The expression
2 exp ð−2δ2LÞ, by Hoeffding’s inequalities [12], bounds
the probability that the deviation from this mean is larger
than δL, and expression (1) takes into account that neither
player should abort.
Security against repudiation: Repudiation occurs when
the protocol is not aborted, the message is authenticated by
one of the recipients, but gets rejected when forwarded to
another recipient. Thus, Alice is, here, the malevolent
player, and her strategies effectively comprise the possible
choices of quantum states she sends in the distribution
stage. Security against repudiation relies on the symmet-
rization property of the multiport—the joint states of Bob’s
and Charlie’s signal ports are invariant under swaps of
matching quantum signature elements—and the fact that
the acceptance thresholds sa and sv differ, so that sv > sa.
The symmetrization property of the multiport implies
that even when post-selected on some sequence of out-
comes for Bob and Charlie, for part of the quantum
signature, the matching reduced density matrices for each
remaining key element are always equal for Bob and
Charlie. This guarantees security against all types of
repudiation attacks. Intuitively, any strategy of Alice,
besides the honest one, will yield a certain average fraction
of mismatches (a fraction Alice can control) between the
declared private key and the signs measured using USD.
Since Bob’s and Charlie’s reduced states are equal, and
they compare their measurement outcomes with the same
declaration, the fraction of mismatches will, on average, be
equal for both players. It is very unlikely for Alice to make
both Bob observe less than sapUSDL mismatches and
Charlie observe more than svpUSDL mismatches. Alice
can choose the average number of mismatches, but each
mismatch independently occurs for either Bob or
Charlie with equal probability. One can show that her
optimal choice is to cause a mismatch with probability
ðsv þ saÞpUSD=2 for each element. Then, Alice’s repudi-
ation probability is bounded by
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PðrepudiationÞ ≤ exp

− 1
2
p2USDðsv − saÞ2L

: (2)
Equation (2) again stems from Hoeffding’s inequalities,
which give the probability that the number of mismatches
deviates from the expected value by more than a fraction.
The full technical derivation of (2), based on ideas above,
which also shows that classical correlations or entangle-
ment does not help Alice, is given in [14].
Security against forging: By forging, we denote the
scenario where a dishonest recipient convinces an honest
recipient that Alice has sent a message when Alice has sent
no message at all (message forging), or a message m0
differing from the message m Alice has in fact sent
(message tampering). For our setting, the probability of
successful message tampering equals the probability of
message forging, as the private keys for two differing
messages are independently distributed. Without loss of
generality, assume that the forging party is Bob.
We identify different types of forging attacks. First, we
distinguish between passive and active attacks. In passive
attacks, Bob behaves honestly in the distribution stage until
step (a) of the protocol. Here, he stores all the quantum
systems outbound from the multiport in quantum memory,
and performs measurements which will optimize his
cheating probability. In active attacks, Bob acts maliciously
throughout the distribution stage. Specifically, Bob can
tamper with his part of the multiport.
Second, we distinguish between individual, collective,
and coherent attacks. This classification is reminiscent of
the traditionally studied attacks in QKD [13]. In individual
attacks, Bob’s action (whether it is measuring the quantum
signature or tampering with his section of the multiport) is
independent for each signature element. In collective
attacks, he may use only strategies which are classically
correlated for different signature elements. For coherent
attacks, we remove this last constraint, allowing quantum
correlations. Such attacks constitute the most general type
of forging activity. Here, we will address the security of our
protocol both for passive and active attacks, and for
individual and collective attacks, and leave the analysis
of coherent attacks for future work.
In passive attacks, Bob wants to make Charlie accept
PrivKeym0 for the single bit message m0 Bob has chosen.
Note that knowing PrivKeym0⊕1 for messagem0⊕1 does not
help, since the signs of the two messages are independently
distributed. Similarly, since all the signs within one private
key are independently distributed, the optimal collective
forging strategy can be shown to be [14] performing
minimum-error measurements [15] on each of the signature
elements in QuantSigm0 . The results of the measurements
are reported to Charlie, who then checks them against his
unambiguous outcomes. Let pmin be the minimum-error
probability, i.e., the probability that Bob incorrectly iden-
tifies a quantum signature element. For two states [8–10],
pmin ¼ 1 − 1
2
ð
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 − e−4α2
p
þ 1Þ: (3)
For Bob to successfully forge with Charlie (that is, have a
faked message verified, which is easier than to forge a
transferrable message as sa < sv), Bobmust correctly guess
a sufficient fraction of Charlie’s unambiguous measurement
outcomes. Since forging, by definition, can occur only
if Charlie does not abort, Charlie has received
at least pUSD0 L unambiguous outcomes, with pUSD0 ¼
pUSD − δ. This lower bound is also the best scenario for
forger Bob, and one can show that
PðforgeÞ ≤ exp

−2

pmin − sv pUSDpUSD0

2
pUSD0 L

: (4)
By setting δ ¼ 0, Eq. (4) would bound the probability of
Bob making an error in his estimate of the encoded phases
fewer than svpUSDL times, out of pUSDL guesses.
In active individual attacks, Bob can prepare response
states η, see Fig. 1, which modifies Charlie’s quantum
signature states. To counteract such attacks, Charlie must
check the multiport null-port counts during distribution, as
they measure the fidelity between the passive-strategy
response state and an active one [14]. Requiring that there
are no null-port counts (i.e., setting r ¼ 0) implies, in the
limit L →∞, that Bob must have been honest throughout
the distribution stage. This reduces active individual attacks
to passive attacks. For collective attacks, it is easy to see
that the space of collective strategies forms a convex
structure, and the optimal cheating probability is achieved
at an extremal point—corresponding to an individual
attack. Thus, collective strategies are no better than
individual. We provide more details, and quantitative
security statements in [14].
Robustness and parameter constraints: Equations (1),
(2), and (3) constrain the internal parameters to ensure
exponential decay in the probabilities of unwanted
events, as a function of L. Concretely, as long as δ > 0
and sv < pminðpUSD − δÞ=pUSD (say δ ¼ pUSD=10 and
sv ¼ pmin=4), we obtain an exponential decay. The param-
eters r and sa can, in the ideal case, be set to 0. We have,
however, left them in expressions and protocol definition,
as they can be used to counteract imperfections occurring in
any realization. For instance, imperfections can cause
mismatches or null-port counts even when everybody is
honest. One can, therefore, choose sa > 0 or r > 0,
respectively. However, detailed analysis of imperfect set-
tings are beyond the scope of this Letter.
We have assumed that all the players share a trusted
reference frame, necessary to define the phase of the
coherent states. This could be realized by having a fourth
party send sequences of strong reference pulses.
Alternatively, Alice could send time-multiplexed pairs of
signal-idler coherent states, with the idler as reference
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beam, as in [3]. The security analysis would then be slightly
different (as the reference beam could be tampered with),
but, with minor modifications, our results would still hold.
Discussion.—A remaining issue, aside from security
against coherent forging, is the requirement for authenti-
cated quantum channels. While general quantum message
authentication [16] is resource-expensive, we need verifi-
cation of only two possible states. Potentially, techniques
similar to those in standard QKD could be employed, by
sacrificing a fraction of the states. This should suffice, as all
that is required is that the classical measurement outcomes
of the quantum states remain unperturbed by the adversary,
rather than arbitrary quantum states. Such an approach
would, in the worst case, yield an additional overhead for
the distribution stage comparable to the cost of running a
QKD protocol. However, it may be possible to further
lower this overhead, and we will further address this in
upcoming work. Finally, our protocol is easily generalized
in many ways. First, using a generalized multiport [2], it
can be extended to any number of recipients. Moreover, the
quantum signatures could be chosen from more than two
states, or among linearly dependent states as in BB84 [17]
QKD. In the latter case, USD is impossible, but minimum-
error measurements, nonoptimal schemes [18–20], or
quantum state elimination could be sufficient. Our protocol
also highlights that certain classical multiparty correlations
are sufficient for secure digital signatures. One may ask
whether such correlations can be achieved by other means,
for instance, by many point-to-point QKD systems.
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